



# The Political Economy of Social Accountability in Tanzania:

Anti-logging Advocacy and the Mama Mitsu Campaign

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## Abbreviations

AcT – Accountability in Tanzania

CBFM – Community Based Forest Management

CCM – Chama Cha Mapinduzi

CHRGG – Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance

CSO – Civil Society Organisation

D-by-D – Decentralisation by Devolution

DC – District Commissioner

DED – District Executive Director

DFID – Department for International Development

DFO – District Forest Officer

DNRO – District Natural Resource Officer

DP – Donor Partner

DPG – Donor Partner Group

FAO – Food and Agriculture Organisation

FBD – Forestry and Beekeeping Division

FSC – Forest Stewardship Council

FSU – Forest Surveillance Unit

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

ha – hectares

JFM – Joint Forest Management

MFAF – Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

MMC – Mama Mitsu Campaign

MNRT – Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism

MP – Member of Parliament

NAO – National Audit Office

NASCAP – National Anti-Corruption Strategy

NGO – Non-governmental Organisation

ODI – Overseas Development Institute

PCCB – Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau

PFM – Participatory Forest Management

PLTF – Pastoralist Livelihoods Task Force

PMO-RALG – Prime Minister's Office-Regional Administration and Local Government

POPSM – President’s Office Public Service Management

PPRA - Public Procurement Regulatory Authority

REDD – Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

RCO – Regional Criminal Officer

TFF – Tanzania Forest Fund

TFS – Tanzania Forest Service

TNRF – Tanzania Natural Resources Forum

TFWG – Tanzania Forestry Working Group

VEO – Village Executive Officer

WEO – Ward Executive Officer

WWG – Wildlife Working Group

## Executive summary

In early 2007, the Tanzanian newspapers were awash with controversy following the publication of a report on the illegal timber trade. The report, entitled '*Forestry, Governance and National Development: Lessons Learnt from a Logging Boom in Southern Tanzania*', was published by the civil society organisation TRAFFIC, with the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, and the Development Partners' Group (DPG).

The TRAFFIC report highlighted the value of forest resources for the livelihoods, communities and government of the Tanzanian people, and how illegal logging deprives Tanzanians of the benefits of this natural resource. It estimated that under-collection of natural forest product royalties at the district level alone results in the loss of up to \$58 million annually, and that only 10 % of potential revenue is collected from timber exports. The TRAFFIC report also emphasised how large-scale corruption and collusion between national and foreign private interests and government officials undermine good forest resource governance. It recommended a broad array of outreach, advocacy, monitoring and transparency policies, as well as changes in forest management practices.

This report draws on the findings from research undertaken as part of the Accountability in Tanzania (AcT) Programme, and examines the *Mama Misitu* ("Mother Forests") Campaign (MMC). This was launched in 2008 as a collective response to the TRAFFIC report by a coalition of civil society organisations that are members of the Tanzania Forestry Working Group (TFWG), and coordinated by the Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF)

Key findings of our research include the following:

- Social accountability activism is most likely to have impact if it works with both the supply and demand side of forest governance.
- To achieve change, it is necessary to work politically, leveraging potential buy-in across the range of local, national and international stakeholders whose interests are affected by new governance institutions and accountability strategies.
- Doing this effectively depends on understanding the local needs, demands, capacities and institutional realities. It is also critical to work through informal networks and institutions, with an understanding prevailing interests and power relations. Where formal institutions are weak and susceptible to capture, this is often where political and economic outcomes are often determined.
- Finally, civil society organisations (CSOs) can learn to use knowledge and communications strategies to change understandings, perceptions and expectations among stakeholders about the merits of improved forest governance and accountability institutions.

### **Social accountability in context**

Accountability is not an abstract process: it is shaped by different local contexts and societal expectations. In Tanzania, as elsewhere, there are various overlapping forms of accountability (Lawson & Rakner 2005). The MMC used the TRAFFIC report findings on the value of forest resources to develop a multi-layered strategy to combat illegal logging and promote better forest governance. The MMC offers lessons on politically informed social accountability strategies by CSOs.

One lesson includes the value of working through a locally grounded understanding of accountability that takes into account different narratives about the legitimate exercise of public office. Awareness of local and national level specificities allows us to see what officials are held accountable for, and how. For instance, one can distinguish between the *process* aspect of accountability (the observance of formal rules of answerability, to enforce and to punish wrong-doing) and the *outcomes* aspect accountability (regardless of whether rules are

observed, people may judge officials on the delivery of specific benefits received by some groups and individuals).

### The political economy of Tanzanian forest governance

The implementation of the TRAFFIC report recommendations, and the scope for MMC to promote positive change, depends on the political economy of Tanzania and its forest sector.

Dominant party rule and overly concentrated executive power have limited the scope for checks and balances. Decentralisation has had only a limited effect on the answerability of public officials. Indeed, it has often strengthened local patrimonial power structures. The increasing presence of business interests in politics has further muddied the waters. Similarly, the formal institutions governing the forest sector interact with, and are occasionally undermined by, strong informal institutions, despite recent measures to improve forest governance such as the Participatory Forest Management (PFM) programme.

Well meaning reforms have lost their effectiveness due to blurred lines of responsibility, the presence of competing incentives for public officials, the existence of powerful countervailing interests, and a lack of coordination in the implementation of forest governance. This has been compounded by the uneven distribution of power, by the fact that people are now aware of the market value of forest products, because of insufficient resources, high foreign and domestic demand for timber, and due to the absence of alternative livelihoods for those involved in illegal forestry activities.



### The Mama Misitu Campaign

The MMC strategy focuses on two objectives in the effort to galvanise collective action against the illegal timber trade:

- To make communities living adjacent to forests aware of **the economic value of forest resources** and the potential benefits of sustainable forest management;
- To demonstrate the **value of better forest governance** for different stakeholders, from the village up to the national government level.

The campaign used the momentum generated by the TRAFFIC report findings to galvanise different stakeholders into collective action against the illegal timber trade. It developed a multi-pronged approach to engage the general public and a range of actors. The campaign tackled both the *demand* and *supply* side of accountability relations in the forest governance system and timber production chain. Key features of the MMC include:

- *Working collaboratively to manage information flows linking demand and supply side actors* – The MMC works through the TFWG network, which strengthens the reach of the campaign, and takes advantage of the various strengths and areas of expertise of the partner organisations;
- *Using knowledge and communications strategically* – The MMC communications strategy targeted the national and local (district and village) levels. It made strategic use of evidence-based knowledge from the TRAFFIC Report on the potential benefits of improved forest governance to shift incentive structures affecting different stakeholders;
- *Working politically to address the balance of power* – The MMC works with different levels of government, as it understands that change is not just about technical reform but should also involve transforming power relations within decision-making and implementation bodies;
- *Working through informal networks* – The MMC has developed strategic alliances among its partner organisations and with other stakeholders on the governance chain including high-level FBD leaders, with the purpose of cultivating inter-personal trust and a shared sense of purpose.



# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Purpose of the research

Illegal logging has been estimated to cost Tanzania \$58 million per year in natural forest product royalties at district level alone. Moreover, only 10 % of potential revenue is collected from timber exports. The costs of this for the nation as a whole are undoubtedly much higher.

This was a central finding of the report on the illegal trade in timber, entitled '*Forestry, Governance and National Development: lessons learnt from a logging boom in Southern Tanzania*' and published in 2007 by TRAFFIC, a civil society organisation, together with the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, and the Donor Partners' Group, a stakeholder convergence which is unprecedented in the Tanzanian natural resources sector. The report findings were difficult to ignore given that the government had endorsed it.

This report tells the story of a particular anti-logging effort, the Mama Mitsu ['mother forests'] Campaign, which was launched in 2008 in response to the TRAFFIC Report.<sup>1</sup>

### Box 1: The importance of forests in Tanzania

Forests are one of Tanzania's most important economic resources, and are particularly important for the rural poor, who are the majority of Tanzania's population. In rural areas, it is estimated that forest resources contribute to the livelihoods of 87% of the poor population (Milledge et al. 2007). Tanzania's 35.3 million hectares of forests and woodlands cover almost 40% of the total mainland (FAO, 2009). Although much forest product consumption remains unrecorded, the MNRT estimates that the annual value of forest produce is about 20% of GDP, taking into account the contribution of forests to bio-diversity, agricultural stability and production, and also addressing climate change and global warming (through carbon sequestration) (MNRT, 2008a in Blomley & Iddi, 2009: 7, based on 2006 prices).

Various districts and municipalities are *highly dependent on forest product* revenues, particularly the southern coastal region where forest sector revenues account for over 50% of some District Council budgets (Milledge et al., 2007). For example, forest product revenues account for 78% of the total budget of the District Council of Nachingwea in the Southern coastal region of Lindi; and in 2000-01 forests accounted for 60% of the total revenues of the Rufiji District (John et al., 2003 in Milledge et al., 2007: 174-5).

## 1.2 The Mama Mitsu Campaign

The MMC is an innovative exercise in social accountability. It is an advocacy and communications campaign that aims to raise awareness of the potential benefits of better forest governance. It grew out of the rapid mobilisation of a group of NGOs and CSOs working under the umbrella of the Tanzania Forestry Working Group (TFWG), and is coordinated by the Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF).<sup>2</sup>

### *The TRAFFIC Report*

The TRAFFIC report presented a detailed account of the causes of illegal logging. In some cases, it is an unintended consequence of public policies to improve communication networks. The opening of the Mkapa bridge over the Rufiji River, for instance, increased access for lorries to carry timber (including illegal timber), as it opened up large forested areas. More

<sup>1</sup> An agreement was secured with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFAF) for a one year learning phase to test methodologies and approaches to be implemented nationally and in two pilot districts, Kilwa and Rufiji. A main implementation phase is being developed on the basis of the pilot project.

<sup>2</sup> The TNRF is a natural resource advocacy and communication network with over 2,700 members. Its mission is to improve natural resource governance. TNRF facilitates and supports member-driven Working Groups on key policy and practice issues.

disturbingly, however, there are national and foreign vested interests that benefit from illegal logging.

### Box 2: Key findings of the TRAFFIC Report

- Forest resources are critical to the livelihoods of Tanzanian people (including 87% of the poor population living in rural areas), and of enormous value to their communities and government.
- Most Tanzanians are missing out on this potential value due to current practices in the sector, with under-collection of natural forest product royalties at district level alone resulting in up to \$58 million of lost revenue annually. Only 10 percent of potential revenue is collected from timber exports.
- Large scale corruption and collusion between private sector interests (both domestic and foreign) and senior Tanzanian and foreign government officials undermines governance of forest resources.
- Unsustainable rates of harvesting and loss of biodiversity mean forest resources were unlikely to be available to future generations of Tanzanians.

The report was an important act of denunciation, and also presented recommendations about how Tanzanian state and society can combat the illegal logging trade.

The key findings of the TRAFFIC report (Box 2) are based on evidence-based research, which demonstrates the true costs of illegal logging for Tanzania. Remarkably, the report openly and explicitly explores the highly controversial political issues at the heart of forest resource

governance in the country. It concludes with wide-ranging recommendations for action on outreach, advocacy, monitoring and transparency, and suggests reforms in management practices.

### *The Campaign*

The intense debate surrounding the launch of the TRAFFIC Report was recognised as an opportunity by 13 like-minded TFWG member organisations to reach different actors involved in the forest governance system, particularly the MNRT, relevant members of Parliament, village government committees, and district officials. From the outset, the TFWG engaged with high level officials to develop an advocacy strategy to inform different political actors of the benefits of taking up the TRAFFIC Report recommendations.

When targeting the MNRT, the campaigners highlighted the environmental damage caused by unlicensed logging and its impact on local communities; when targeting MPs working on the Committees of Natural Resources and of Finance and Economic Affairs, and district level officials, campaigners emphasised the losses incurred by illegal logging (Sianga 2010). The campaign quickly evolved into an organised effort to sustain the Report's public visibility.

The MMC strategy focuses on two objectives in the effort to galvanise collective action against the illegal timber trade:

- To make communities living adjacent to forests aware of **the**

### Box 3: MMC Membership

The MMC emerged from the TFWG, which includes over 45 partner organisations working on forestry issues and advocacy. The TFWG is hosted by the Tanzanian Natural Resource Forum (TNRF), which coordinates the campaign and provides support for projects undertaken by TFWG members.

Eighteen TFWG member organizations opted to participate in the campaign (Care TZ, FARM-Africa, Femina-HIP, ICRAF, IUCN, JET, LEAT, MJUMITA, MCP, Policy Forum, Africare, TAF, TFCG, TNRF, TRAFFIC, WCS, WCST and WWF-TCO). These organizations carry out various tasks as campaign members: they are members of the advisory and steering committees, implement actions on the ground, and engage in and promote the campaign nationally. Thus, varying member competences have been fully exploited.

**economic value of forest resources** and the potential benefits of sustainable forest management;

- To demonstrate the **value of better forest governance** for different stakeholders, from the village up to the national government level.

On the basis of the TRAFFIC Report, the MMC developed a multi-pronged strategy to achieve change at different levels of the forest governance chain and the illegal timber trade.

- *The MMC partnership has been working politically to address the balance of power from the outset, attempting to engage with different levels of the forest governance chain. This includes mobilising at a high political level, by identifying key MPs and potential allies in the Ministry of Finance, and working at the village and district levels.*
- *The MMC has worked collaboratively through a diverse partnership of member organisations, each of which reaches different target groups and contributes different knowledge and skills to the campaign. This involves working with institutions that have established a presence at the community level and are thus able to raise awareness and communicate the key messages of the campaign.*
- *The MMC has made use of the media momentum to lobby for change, deploying interactive communications strategies and using different media outlets to target different audiences.*
- *The MMC has made strategic use of knowledge to promote awareness of the scale of losses incurred by illegal logging and the benefits of improved forest governance among different stakeholders along the timber production and governance chains (ranging from villages, to licit timber companies, up to the MNRT). The idea is that knowledge of the facts can help shift incentive structures and cost-benefit perceptions about illegal logging.*
- *The MMC has used informal networks to establish key alliances with stakeholders along the governance chain. This has involved mostly mobilising personal contacts at different levels of the FBD, and among village and district level government officials.*

#### Box 4: Strategies for communication used during the MMC during the pilot phase:

- Strengthening national and sub-district civil society and community networks through engagement in the campaign at the policy and implementation levels
- Holding meetings (formal, informal) with different stakeholders, from sub-village to inter ministerial/ donor meetings
- Engaging in dialogue at different levels, and using personal relations to engage with forest governance issues
- MMC messages developed and delivered through t-shirts, caps, kangas, village notice boards and TV adverts
- Radio and TV debates, plays and advertisements
- Song and drama at community level using local drama groups
- Schools competitions (music, drama, poetry and paintings)

The campaign is guided by six Issue Groups (Box 5) that address some of the key recommendations of the TRAFFIC Report, and around which activities are organised. The issue groups are also the template for the development of progress indicators.


During the pilot phase, the MMC focussed on the districts of Kilwa (Lindi region) and Rufiji (Coast region), both to the south of Dar es Salaam.<sup>3</sup> Forests there have become “heavily degraded” as a result of “heavy

degraded” as a result of “heavy logging, agricultural encroachment and other forest activities” (Milledge et al 2007: 39, citing the Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD)). The Mpingo Project (Kilwa) and the World Wildlife Fund (Rufiji) are the partner organisations leading the campaigns at the district and sub-district levels.

The broader goal of the campaign is to target the different levels of the forest governance framework, but until now the MMC has concentrated its efforts on the harvesting stage of the timber trade chain (Figure 1). This primarily involves work at the village level, mostly raising awareness of the value of forest revenue and the benefits of Participatory Forest Management (PFM). This local sector governance framework is the most conducive to

giving communities control of resources and decision-making about how to manage their forest resources. While the campaign has focused on harvesting activities, its future effectiveness will depend on its ability to promote improved governance along the value chain, to reform forest governance at the government, civil society and private business levels (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1: Points of intervention by the MMC along a forest product supply chain



### 1.3 About this study

The research for this report was undertaken as part of the Accountability in Tanzania (AcT) programme funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) in the UK, and is the result of a joint collaboration between the TNRF and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

This study examines the experience and lessons of the MMC, using a political economy approach to identify the factors that explain the strategic innovations of the campaign, its successes in promoting change, and the limitations it faces. The study examines the interface between the participating organisations and other stakeholders, the institutional framework of anti-logging activities, and the power relations and interests involved in the logging industry, which stand in the way of anti-logging efforts.

<sup>3</sup> According to Milledge et al (2007: 35), there was an upsurge in illegal logging in the southeast, which is one of the poorest regions in Tanzania, and most rural livelihoods there depend on forest resources.

Section two discusses accountability and provides a conceptual map of key power dynamics and legitimacy narratives underlying the illegal timber trade. Section three provides an overview of the country's and forest sector's political economy. Section four assesses how the MCC has used opportunity structures to change perceptions of forest governance, policy and practice and existing constraints.

## 2 The Logic of Accountability

A key question in this study is whether and how CSOs can usefully contribute to making decision-makers more accountable for their actions. In order to understand the role of the MCC in this regard, it is useful to unpack the concept of accountability and to analyse social expectations regarding the conduct of public officials.

### 2.1 The multiple dimensions of accountability

Accountability has more than one dimension. Standard definitions emphasise the importance of transparency, answerability and enforceability. On this view, accountability is "ability to ensure that public officials are answerable for their behaviour (...) to justify and inform the citizens of their decisions and about their decisions and possibly eventually be sanctioned for them" (Schedler 1999).

However, in some contexts, "there is no distinction [...] between public and private resources, there is no presumption of equality, and no clear idea of democracy" (Lawson & Rakner 2005: 21-22), and other informal rules of engagement prevail. These often involve patrimonial structures of exchange, which rely on different logics of accountability and appeal to different narratives of legitimacy. Thus, standard notions of accountability can co-exist with established (and even accepted) practices of corruption and nepotism. In some cases Tanzanian politicians may be held to account not for the extent to which they follow formal rules or promote transparency, but for the extent to which they provide material benefits to communities, regardless of the corruption that this might entail.

We must therefore acknowledge the existence of multiple logics of accountability, each reflecting different beliefs and attitudes about what constitutes legitimate government practice. On their own, neither approach to accountability satisfactorily explains the range of discourses, practices and expectations of accountability. The two co-exist, and actors shift between them according to context, normative preference, or convenience. Striking a middle ground between these interpretations may give us a better understanding of what happens in Tanzania.

### 2.2 Accountability systems and legitimacy

A locally-grounded understanding of accountability thus adds complexity to the picture. Different beliefs about accountability shape what decision-makers may be held accountable for, and how they gain legitimacy. Legitimacy narratives regarding the exercise of public office reflect different logics at varying national and sub-national contexts. Mostly it is based on prevailing beliefs about what state-society relations should look like, and about what public officials should be held to account for and how (Bellina et al 2009). In this context:

- We must consider the *process dimension of accountability*: namely the observation of *formal rules* of answerability, enforcement and punishment. This is the standard legal-rational discourse of accountability, which focuses mostly on 'abiding by the rules.' Crucially, while the focus is on process, this view assumes that good outcomes will follow.
- We must also consider the *outcomes* dimension of accountability: namely, are officials judged more on the *concrete benefits* they obtain for groups and individuals, regardless of whether they comply with formal accountability frameworks?

In some contexts, citizens may be willing to accept diminished process accountability if outcomes are seen as sufficiently rewarding. In patrimonial systems, for instance, legitimacy may depend more on leaders' ability to provide material well-being, than on the legal probity of their actions.

In general, the legitimacy of a set of rules governing the behaviour of decision-makers is not fixed and evolves over time. In the short run, what matters are *outcomes* as perceived by the community and other relevant stakeholders. In the long run, however, when beneficial *outcomes are sustained*, the *process* dimension of accountability may acquire greater value. Attitudinal change and shifts in social norms occur as citizens accept new institutional forms (not just outcomes).

### 2.3 Levels of accountability

There are two further dimensions of the standard 'rational legal' account of accountability: horizontal and vertical (see Figure 2), and legal and political accountability. Both matter here, as the MMC has attempted to work with both.

*Horizontal accountability* refers to the mechanisms of oversight and checks and balances within state structures, including through the separation of powers, and the mutual checks between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It also involves various additional oversight bodies such as, among others, Auditors General offices, ombudsmen, anti-corruption commissions, or human rights commissions.

*Vertical accountability* refers to the mechanisms by which society holds public and elected officials to account. It includes elections, which allow citizens to reward or sanction elected officials and candidates, but also involves broader mechanisms of *social accountability*. In research on sub-Saharan Africa, this means "the more informal role of non-state agents checking governments' powers via the media, civil society organizations, and popular protest" (Mmari et al 2005). Research on Latin America takes the concept further and includes either more politically informed forms of social mobilisation from below, or citizens' capacity to activate horizontal accountability mechanisms (for instance, initiating legal mobilisation 'from below').<sup>4</sup> On this view, social accountability is not just about protesting, raising awareness or engaging in advocacy 'from below'; it can also mean engaging with horizontal accountability mechanisms. This is relevant for MMC.

Figure 2: The horizontal and vertical dimensions of accountability



<sup>4</sup> For work on social accountability from below, see: Peruzzotti & Smulovitz (2006); Mainwaring & Welna (DATE); Gargarella et al (2006).

*Legal accountability* refers to mechanisms “aimed at ensuring that the actions of public officials are legally and constitutionally framed” (Peruzzotti & Smulovitz 2006: 5-6). It depends on the existence of codified rules, judicial autonomy, the rules of legal standing<sup>5</sup>, and on citizens’ capacity to mobilise legally. In Tanzania, environmental law gives citizens and civil society organisations (CSOs) the legal standing to file suit, but the same is not true under forestry law.<sup>6</sup> However, the effectiveness of legal accountability mechanisms depends also on public levels of awareness of how to use legal channels, and on the credibility of law enforcement bodies (judges and police forces). Legal challenges are often obstructed by difficulties in access to justice, extremely slow or inefficient judicial processes, or high levels of corruption in the lower courts (Gloppen 2003).

*Political accountability* refers to “the responsiveness of governmental policies to the preferences of the electorate” (Peruzzotti & Smulovitz 2006: 6). What constitutes unresponsive political action depends on citizens’ expectations about probity in public office.

Crucially, legal and political accountability are not always aligned. In Tanzania, for instance, political accountability seems to trump legal accountability during electoral campaigns. Candidates do not want to take a position on illegal logging, as they want to avoid alienating campaign funders who may have links to the logging industry and may adhere to a patrimonial version of political accountability to maximise their chances of electoral success. Of course, the links between logging and political financing are systemic and institutional, not just opportunistic and linked to individual candidates. In any case, as noted above, legal accountability through judicial oversight is weak in Tanzania.

## 2.4 A Political economy analysis

Purely ‘technical’ solutions to developmental challenges, however sound, have proved disappointing. Donors, CSOs and other actors are more aware of the need to understand local political and power dynamics, and navigate complex sets of political, economic and social interests in order to achieve their development goals. Political economy analysis has emerged as a useful analytical framework for understanding these complex interactions (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi 2009) to inform policy and practice.

Following this approach, this report examines the structural constraints resulting from prevailing institutions of governance, including both formal systems and the informal political processes and ‘rules of the game’ that determine *de facto* practices, to understand the incentives and choices affecting key actors in the illegal trade in logging. A political economy analysis also takes into account the changing nature of the interaction between rules and actors, allowing us to understand what room for manoeuvre exists to improve forest governance.

## 2.5 Key points

- It is necessary to have a layered and locally-grounded understanding of social expectations regarding accountability.
- This means taking into account the prevailing logic of legitimacy governing state-society relations. We must look at whether rulers abide by the formal rules of the game (the process dimension), at the material benefits that citizens feel they receive (outcomes), and at legitimacy narratives, which are also the product of deliberately articulated discourses benefiting particular power structures.
- It is therefore necessary to examine not only the formal rules of governance, but also the informal institutions that shape social and political exchanges, and the prevailing distribution of power and resources, and look at how these are viewed by different stakeholders and population sectors.

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<sup>5</sup> ‘Rules of standing’ refers to who is entitled to take a case or claim to court.

<sup>6</sup> Interview with LEAT legal activist in Dar es Salaam.

- In reality different dynamics of accountability and legitimacy co-exist. The interaction between them changes over time, and these dynamics vary at the national and sub-national levels.
- A political economy analysis can unpack the specific constraints on and opportunities for collective action to induce change.

## 3 Tanzania's political economy

In this section, we present both a general overview of the national political economy context and a review of key aspects of institutions and incentives in the forest sector. The objective is to identify the main institutional constraints and opportunities that lead different actors to support or obstruct forest governance and accountability mechanisms covering illegal logging.

### 3.1 The national political economy

Here, we outline the features that are most relevant for understanding the political economy context as relevant to the MMC. Formally, Tanzania has a multiparty electoral democracy. In reality, it has a strong executive and unchallenged dominant party rule since 1992. Since independence, Tanzania has engaged in a relatively politically stable, peaceful and socially integrated process of nation and state-building (Hussman & Mmuya 2007). But the country's governance system is also characterised by neo-patrimonialism and weak rational-legal accountability mechanisms (Hussman & Mmuya 2007; Hyden 2005; Kelsall et al 2005).

#### *Executive dominance*

Executive dominance looms large in the incentive structures that shape the political system and the behaviour of political and social actors within it. This also applies to the forestry sector. The executive branch has far-reaching formal and informal powers concentrated in the figure of the president. The head of state appoints the Prime Minister, all cabinet members, the chief executives of the civil service, judges of the High Court and Court of Appeal, as well as regional and district (and municipal) commissioners (who represent the executive at the local level).

#### *Dominant party rule*

Despite the formal shift to multiparty competition in 1992 and the holding of multi-party elections in 1995, a single party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has been in power since independence. The causes for its continued dominance include: the fact that opposition parties cannot form alliances when competing for office; the constraints imposed by the first-past-the-post electoral system; the capacity of the CCM to co-opt the opposition; the weakness of the 18 opposition parties (Hussman & Mmuya 2005; Hoffman & Robinson 2009). Limited inter-party political competition diminishes the scope for pluralist decision-making, and renders political checks and balances less effective. The overlap between the party and state structures from the national to the district and village levels also weakens political accountability.

Some analysts highlight that there is intra-CCM competition, and that the alternation of power and political turnover occurs within the dominant party (Mmari et al 2005: 48-9). Thus, there is not an automatic rubberstamping of executive orders. Further, the CCM does engage in 'vote-winning' behaviours that are sensitive to the preferences of the electorate. For instance, the decision in 2003 to bring back agricultural subsidies against the advice of the technocrats is an example of this. However, intra-CCM political competition is largely dictated by a neo-patrimonial logic rather than based on legal-rational notions of accountability to the electorate. Moreover, district and village level elites respond to the incentive structures established by enmeshed private and public interests, dominant party dynamics and executive dominance. Private business (and illegal logging) interests are increasingly relevant sources of electoral funding. This further undermines vertical accountability, and creates significant political power asymmetries (Milledge et al 2007). All these features diminish the incentive for national and local elites to back systems of accountability that enhance probity in public office.



### *Formal mechanisms of horizontal accountability*

Horizontal mechanisms of accountability are weak in Tanzania. Parliament is more than a rubber-stamping institution, but deliberation and oversight are weak since the dominant party has held 84 percent of the seats (down to 74% after the 2010 election). The judiciary is formally and politically weak. There is security of tenure, but high court judges are appointed by the president. The quality of the justice sector is compromised by lack of resources, poor wages, inefficiency and limited access for most citizens to the lower courts (Gloppen 2003).

Tanzania does have a history of anti-corruption measures. Some merely pay lip service to international donor demands, but others constitute a genuine response to corruption scandals that were widely reported in the media.<sup>7</sup> However, the constraints on the powers of horizontal accountability bodies are powerful (Hussman & Myuma 2007). The *formal* legal and regulatory framework is insufficiently robust, and oversight conditions and checks and balances remain largely ineffective. In sum, horizontal accountability is weakened by legal loopholes, the excessive powers vested in the executive branch, and insufficient incentives and opportunities for independent oversight action by relevant actors (Lawson & Rakner 2005).

### *Decentralisation-by-devolution*

In order to understand the politics of forest governance and district and village level accountability we must also consider the incomplete process of decentralisation-by-devolution (D-by-D) initiated in 1972,<sup>8</sup> the concomitant limited empowerment of local authorities, and the broader Local Government Reform Programme established in 1999. These have established complex layers of government and public administration, and parallel systems of reporting and answerability. There is a sense that decentralisation has not much improved transparency, answerability or law enforcement, and that it has created local systems of neo-patrimonialism that facilitate elite capture of public resources at the district and village levels.

D-by-D has expanded substantially the responsibilities of local government authorities under the aegis of the Prime Minister's Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG). But in practice, the distinction between central and local government is blurred by the presidentially appointed District Commissioners (DC), who wield substantial (if often informal) power. However, constituents can, in theory, call officials to account through the elected District Council and its executive offices (which includes the District Executive Director (DED) appointed by the President). Where the Council is especially active, as in Loliondo Ngorongoro, there is considerable tension between the Council and the DC, as they respond to countervailing pressures.

The influence of the DED is also felt at the ward and village levels, through the appointment of Ward Executive Officer (WEO) and Village Executive Officer (VEO). These posts are filled through application to the respective locally elected District Council. However, District Council Disciplinary and Appointment Committees short-list, interview and select candidates, and the DED usually chairs appointments and disciplinary committees, and has the final say on hiring and firing.

### *Vertical accountability and civil society activism*

There are various problems that affecting CSO activism in Tanzania (as elsewhere). First, CSOs with more resources and access to government and Development Partner (DP) decision-making circles are often urban-based and do not necessarily represent society as a whole.

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<sup>7</sup> Anti-corruption measures and bodies include: the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NASCAP) and strengthening formal institutions such as the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB); the Ethics Secretariat, which administers the income and assets of elected public officials and senior civil servants; the Inspectorate of Ethics in the Presidential office of Public Service Management (POPSM), with a mandate to control corruption in the public service; the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in charge of prosecuting corruption; the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRGG), the successor of the Ombudsman; the National Audit Office (NAO); and the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA). Tanzania's latest anti-corruption law passed in 2007 is deemed to have aligned Tanzania more closely with international norms.

<sup>8</sup> At present, decentralization is framed by the 1998 Local Government Policy.

Second, CSOs participate in a system of upward accountability, since their key concern is to have the ear of government and DPs. Third, since they are unelected bodies it is difficult to know to what extent they are representative. Fourth, in the case of Tanzania, the government attempts to limit the influence of the country's CSOs (Hussman & Mmuya 2005).

Despite these limitations, some CSOs have become visible actors on the political landscape in Tanzania. In some cases, they are pursuing innovative social accountability strategies by undertaking more politically involved activities. This entails more sophisticated approaches to advocacy and awareness-raising, which address both the *demand* and *supply* side of accountability. This enables them to have an impact on how accountability mechanisms work at different levels of government and society, and to help shift incentive structures for the relevant actors engaged with these institutions. The MMC approach is an example of this.

However, informal rules and networks shape the culture and practice of public office and colour state-society relations at all levels. They do not necessarily work against accountability but may respond to a different logic of answerability and sanctions than those imposed by formal law (Lawson and Rakner 2005; Hussman & Mmuya 2005). What logic of accountability dominates is likely to be dictated by the prevailing perceptions about costs and benefits that derive from one system or another; and by the balance of power between the relevant actors. At the same time, lobbying for change involves mobilising informal networks of contacts, personal relations, and facilitating opportunities for dialogue, exchange and consultation, and a push to establish new narratives of accountability, public office probity, alternative views of costs and benefits, and improved use of public and natural resources.

The governance landscape outlined above is a changing one. Institutional reform has a cumulative effect, generating incremental layers of formal opportunities that, over time, may give rise to new narratives and practices of vertical and horizontal accountability. Some reforms may accelerate change more than others; others are motivated by electoral interests or international pressure. Specific events or acts of denunciation, such as the TRAFFIC Report, can heighten public awareness about the cost of impunity, opening up a window of opportunity to mobilise to change policy and practice, and generating additional incentives for power-holders to commit to reform, if only to avoid the reputational costs of inaction.

### 3.2 The political economy of the forest sector

Decision-making, oversight and enforcement in Tanzanian forest governance is fragmented and multi-layered, involving both formal and informal institutions. At the formal level, it is governed by a series of specific policies (Box 6) under the aegis of the 1998 National Forest Policy to promote the sustainable conservation of forest resources.

The 2002 Forest Act provides the legal framework for conservation and management of forest resources; it regulates trade in forest products; and it categorises forests, the relevant management structures, and corresponding government authorities for each type of forest. Notably, the Forest Act also establishes the governance framework for PFM, which allows village authorities to declare village property those forests and forest resources that exist on village land.

The Forestry and Bee-keeping Division (FBD) of the MNRT is the main actor responsible for forest sector governance,<sup>9</sup> supervising, and providing policy guidance and technical expertise. FBD presence on the ground is limited and enforcement relies heavily on local authorities. The President appoints the Director of Forestry at the head of the FBD, who is answerable to the Minister. This gives the Director some autonomy within the Ministry, and the appointee, Dr. Felician Kilahama, is widely viewed as an asset for promoting good forest governance. However, autonomy is relative as the system also potentially allows for executive influence over the FBD.

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<sup>9</sup> As new funding streams become available (for the development of REDD and REDD+ and carbon finance initiatives, for instance), other government sectors may become increasingly relevant.

Various measures were adopted in 2003 and 2004 to curb illegal logging, sometimes in the wake of stakeholder concern over high levels of uncontrolled harvesting, trade and export. These measures included an increase in the number of FBD checkpoints and operational Forest Surveillance Units (FSU); harvest and export bans; and management interventions to improve controls and equity of harvesting and export of timber products. However, the measures were often reactive rather than strategic, and were often not properly followed up. It is reported, for instance, that “following completion of forest inventories, during a nationwide harvest/export ban, harvesting was again reopened in September 2005 as a result of growing pressure from local communities and forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections” (Milledge et al 2007: 40). Even when bans have been implemented, well-connected companies were either exempted or received early warning of impending enforcement actions. An analysis the timber trade between 2004 and early 2006 states that many of the companies that were allowed to export during periods of limited trading were linked to senior public officials. Indeed, more than 80% of timber volumes coming from companies had linkages with senior Tanzania government officials (Milledge et al 2007).

A succession of formal measures has been adopted over the last decade, signalling the government’s commitment to combat illegal timber trading, but this has been countered by purposive attempts to counteract measures in order to protect concrete economic or political interests, or by the fact that there are insufficient resources and capabilities to enforce the measures effectively. Interviews suggest that this is partly because of the low wages paid to employees charged with implementing formal accountability rules (in absolute terms, or relative to the perceived self-value of employees), and partly because there are insufficient staff and equipment to carry out assigned duties. This increases opportunities for collusion with the illegal timber trade

Informants also suggested that action is taken first and foremost for the sake of appearances rather than because the Ministry is committed to change. The government thus adopts measures as a knee jerk response to public outrage, and to boost deteriorating legitimacy levels, rather than out of a deliberate and sincere commitment to change the rules of the game. Whatever the motivations, such measures may have unintended consequences. Over time, they may establish cumulatively a regulatory and governance framework that will act as a reference point for institutions and gradually reshape public perceptions and conduct in relation to accountability.

#### Box 6: Key forest sector policies, acts and guidelines

- 1995 – Land Policy
- 1998 – Forest Policy
- 1998 – Wildlife Policy
- 1999 – Land Act
- 1999 – Village Land Act
- 2002 – Forest Act
- 2001-2010 – National Forest Programme
- 2004 – Environmental Management Act
- 2007 – Guidelines for Sustainable Harvesting and the Trade of Forest Produce
- 2007 – CBFM Guidelines

More recently, the forest sector governance is on the edge of a potentially far-reaching institutional reform. The creation of the Tanzania Forest Service (TFS) is now underway. The mandate of this new executive authority includes managing national natural forest reserves, national plantations and forest resources in general, and the enforcement of forestry legislation within TFS jurisdictions. All FBD staff will be transferred to the TFS except those who are involved in the limited remaining functions of the FBD (policy and legislation development, monitoring and evaluation of implementation, supervision of law enforcement, training coordination and management, and research and extension activities, (MNRT, 2010)).


In addition to the TFS, other planned reforms include setting in motion the Tanzanian Forest Fund (TFF) provided for by the 2002 Forest Act. This presents both opportunities and challenges for improved forest governance and for initiatives like the MMC. Once in operation,

the TFF will be linked to the TFS, providing a steady stream of significant revenue and a degree of financial autonomy that the FBD has lacked given its relatively meagre budget from the Finance Ministry.

*Decentralization in the forest sector*

With decentralization, central government makes policy and offers technical advice, but local authorities are in charge of implementing forestry sector policy. In principle, this should reshape horizontal accountability in forest governance. Although the DED, the DC and various components of the Regional Administrative Secretariat connect central and local government authorities, specific linkages in the forest sector remain weak. In practice, the division of authority between the FBD in the MNRT and local authorities under the PMO-RALG presents significant challenges for horizontal accountability (Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Inter-ministerial fragmentation in forest governance**



This has resulted in:

- *Blurred lines of responsibility:* It is believed that complex and often dual lines of reporting contribute to slow and problematic information flows between the FBD and local authorities, and to poor oversight and discipline within the sector. One example is the opaque relationship between the district forest officers (DFOs), who

are generally local government employees, and the FBD. Whilst DFOs are answerable to locally elected District Councils through their DED, there are varying levels of informal reporting to FBD. Financial and administrative issues are reported first to the District Council, and then to the parent ministry (PMO-RALG), which are responsible for compiling consolidated results and communicating that information to the FBD. However, as the FBD remains responsible for forest policy and legal implementation, impact and output reporting should flow directly from local authorities to the FBD. Lack of clarity in the chain of command is also deemed to impede revenue collection in the sector (SAVCOR, 2005, cited in Milledge et al 2007), and stand in the way of accountability (Blomley 2006).

- *Competing incentives:* Despite the high-level national goals set out in the 1998 Forest Policy and National Forest Programme, in practice the management of forest resources is subject to competing demands. Areas of potential conflict include the targets for timber revenue collection and the size and prioritisation of expenditure options within the sector. PMO-RALG and local authorities have tended to neglect investment and to emphasise increasing revenue collection to meet or even exceed the growing annual targets for the sector. Some studies find that “there was pressure placed on most forest officers in the study area to issue licences as a means to increase revenue to the district” (Milledge et al 2007: 94). In contrast, foresters within the FBD tend to stress limits on harvests to maintain sustainable yields over the medium to long-term.
- *The creation of parallel structures:* Fieldwork by the authors in August 2010 documented the existence of multiple and uncoordinated checkpoints in the same town operating under different jurisdictions but carrying out related forest product inspection tasks. The checkpoint system suffers from various weaknesses, such as capacity-based challenges (i.e. inadequate manual recording of information) and outright complicity on the part of some checkpoint officers. Even where checkpoints appear to operate according to the guidelines, the TNRF claims that those established by district councils and staffed with district employees “were mostly concerned with maximizing revenue collection and cared little for the sustainability or legality of forest products” (2009: 28). Communication between these authorities and those under MNRT leadership is limited, and poor maintenance of records of forest revenue and of the movement of forest resources prevents ex-post comparative analysis of forest products passing along the road to Dar es Salaam. As a result, there are fewer effective checks on the behaviour of individual checkpoint officers (including illicit behaviour such as the acceptance of bribes). As Blomley and Iddi (2009) note, this problem cannot be resolved with the multiplication of checkpoints.

#### *Innovation in formal institutions: Participatory Forest Management*

Local forest sector institutions operate at various levels, varying in importance according to forest type.<sup>10</sup> The most significant actors in the two pilot districts where the Mama Misitu Campaign has been working were the district and village level authorities. The interaction between these two levels of authority is critical given the major recent changes in Tanzanian forest governance: the development and proliferation of Participatory Forest Management (PFM) practices.

PFM has significantly increased the scope for the involvement of local communities in managing and establishing oversight over forest resources, and thus has the potential to empower and increase the decision-making powers of villages on the use of forest resources. PFM is legally underpinned by the 1998 National Forest Policy and the 2002 Forest Act. Both establish the right of communities to declare and gazette Village, Group or Community and Private Forest Reserves, to own and manage those forests (under Community Based Forest

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<sup>10</sup> Section 32 of the Forest Act of 2002 distinguishes between four different types of forest: national forest reserves; local authority forest reserves; village forests; and private forests, each with their own management authority.

Management - CBFM) and to enter into agreements to co-manage national forest reserves with government authorities (under Joint Forest Management - JFM).

Following its introduction, PFM coverage increased substantially (in terms of forest coverage and number of participating villages). Areas under PFM now total more than 4 million hectares, accounting for 12.8% of the total forest area in Tanzania (MNRT, 2010). The use of CBFM arrangements now exceeds that of JFM. In part, the tendency to adopt CBFM reflects the clarity of both its administrative procedures and its rules governing cost-benefit sharing (Box 7). In communities that adopt JFM or CBFM practices, the patterns of distribution of costs and benefits of forest sector activities, and perceptions about institutional arrangements are likely to change. This can shift incentive structures and potentially change behaviour. Some studies show that where forest management has been devolved, the result is a substantial improvement in forest conditions, reduced forest disturbance (Blomley & Iddi 2009: 25), and higher community household incomes. However, awareness of PFM is still very limited among the rural population, with knowledge of relevant legislation limited to those areas where interventions were already underway (Forrester 2008).

### Box 7: Economic incentives for PFM

Unclear rules about sharing forest product income limit JFM revenues. But under CBFM, local communities benefit from a range of economic incentives, including:

- A waiver on state royalties on forest produce and permission to sell produce at market rates;
- The retention, in principle, of a 100 percent of revenue from the sale of forest products;
- The authority to levy and retain fines;
- Exemption from the national reserved species list;
- The authority to confiscate illegally harvested forest products and associated equipment;
- Exemption from local government taxes on forest produce from village forest management (though many villages do pay district authorities for services rendered in the sector)

Source: Milledge et al 2007; Blomely & Iddi 2009.

It is unclear to what extent decentralisation of forest management increases accountability or changes incentive structures. Some authors suggest that vertical accountability has increased after a revision of harvesting procedures in the context of PFM implementation, "further enhance[ing] the role of village leadership by ensuring their place at relevant district-level discussions" (Milledge et al 2007: 190). However, this assumes that village government is more responsive to community than district or national level authorities. Vertical accountability is seen when the distance between citizens and decision-makers is reduced, but local authorities are not necessarily better representatives of the interests of the community. There are often entrenched local power structures allowing village elites to control forest resources to the exclusion of the general population; and village leaders are often part of the same elites as district and national leaders, with very limited accountability towards local communities. Because of this, they can negate the "democratic" benefits of PFM (Blomley & Iddi 2009: 42, reporting on PFM in 2008).

PFM has also been undermined by other factors affecting incentives for community involvement.

- First, there is poor knowledge of the law and of the rights of communities to own forest resources, and a perception that forest management is a top-down central government affair.
- Second, PFM implementation has been very slow given high levels of bureaucracy, so that village controls over illegal harvesting is still very limited (Milledge et al 2007: 73).

- Third, there is limited local government knowledge and capacity, and often districts fear that PFM will diminish revenues from legal harvesting at the village level for local government.

### **Box 8: Corruption and accountability in the sandalwood trade**

Late one evening in 2005, members of a village forest committee in a district in north-central Tanzania seized a Fuso truck. It was loaded with 8 cubic meters of sandalwood (a reserved forest tree famous for its commercial value and in high demand both within and outside the country). This had been illegally harvested from the surrounding forests by poor villagers who later sold the wood to forest smugglers. The market value for the load was estimated to be over Tshs 10 million. The villagers were already implementing the PFM project initiated in mid 1990s and the village forest committee was in position and active.

After seizing the truck, the issue was reported to the VEO who also reported to his boss – the WEO. The forest committee patrol group, the VEO and WEO escorted the truck with the illegal materials to the District Police Headquarters. On the way to police station, the lorry driver stopped the engine, claiming that the lorry had broken down. The WEO telephoned the police and requested their assistance, while the driver called the District Natural Resources Officer (DNRO) to tell him about the problem.

The DNRO arrived on the scene before the police, and ordered village leaders to take the illegal sandalwood to his office, which the WEO and VEO refused to do. When the police arrived, the DNRO told them that the issue was under his mandate, but the police ordered the lorry driver to take the seized timber to the police station where the DNRO could discuss the appropriate next steps with district police officials. The WEO then reported the issue to DFO, who went to the police station to check on the actions taken by his boss (DNRO). The DNRO had in fact opened a case file for the driver transporting sandalwood without official permits, but the DFO was distressed to see that the owner of the sandalwood had not been included in the case account.

The sandalwood remained at the police station for weeks as further investigations took place. Following informal discussions between the DNRO and the Regional Criminal Officer (RCO) (with whom he had a close personal relationship), the RCO ordered the district police office to dispose of the sandalwood, arguing that it would lose its commercial quality if subjected to prolonged exposure to the sun. The RCO also emphasised to the district police the need to work closely with the DNRO about how to dispose of the seized materials. The DNRO recommended that the culprit should pay a fine of around Tshs 150,000 (an amount close to the official forest royalty charge for that product) that that the sandalwood should be sold to any interested party.

It later transpired that an illegal businessman bought the sandalwood and disappeared with it. No revenue was ever returned to the villagers who had seized the truck, to the district council or to the FBD. The WEO and villagers made several unsuccessful attempts to follow-up the case at the District Headquarters and with the police. However, when the issue was taken up as a political complaint by a councillor from that ward, the DNRO, who had worked in that district for more than 10 years, was transferred to another district.

Source: Key informant interview

In practice, national and local forest sector formal institutions interact with, and are undermined by, strong informal institutions and vested interests (Box 8), because formal institutions lack resources to enforce, straining capacity, and encouraging non-compliance. Sometimes the livelihoods and even lives of enforcement agents are threatened. Further, there are the problems posed by local and national embedded social norms, informal rules and

institutions, perverse incentive structures emerging from existing power dynamics, and the political and private benefits obtained from collusion with illegal logging.

Moreover, local power structures interact with powerful national and international interests. Anecdotal evidence from the forest sector shows that the majority of illegal logging practices are undertaken by actors outside the community. This suggests that the informal norms which may check the illegal behaviour of locals do not check the activities of outsiders, who pursue their interests unchecked by partially-implemented formal rules and weak informal community rules of answerability.

Although the Forest Act provides for severe penalties, in practice when perpetrators are caught in violation of the law, traditional rules of reciprocity call for the repayment of the value of illegally obtained goods. Thus, loggers who are caught without permits are often only asked to pay for the permit on the spot. When there are punitive damages, fines are often of a value equal to the value of the illegally obtained forest products – and then often pocketed by the enforcing agent. Such weak punishment is insufficient to deter violations.

Social norms governing the use of forest resources also vary between communities, and there is a tradition of free access to forest resources among rural communities. Thus, “harvesting and trade in timber products in contravention to forest legislation [is] not always considered an illegal activity” (Milledge et al 2007: 127). For many rural Tanzanians, harvesting activities are not seen as illegal as, say, livestock theft or adultery, which are considered crimes. Limited village and district level awareness of the law compounds this problem. The result is relative impunity for high-ranking officials at the district level, within the FBD and in the MNRT, often in the form of bribery (Milledge et al 2007). These prevailing social norms are compounded by the fact that awareness of the law is limited at the village and district level.

Finally, the distinction between a tip and a bribe is unclear in a context where the line between private gain and official duty becomes blurred because of systems of nepotism and patronage. This facilitates close relationships between government and business and collusive behaviour that undermine the enforcement of current forest governance legislation.

Overall, *de facto* rules of behaviour are guided by prevailing social norms rather than law. Forest sector practices reflect the broader patterns of power and political and economic relations. Further, power asymmetries and differential levels of involvement with the timber trade also lead to an inequitable distribution of the gains from illegal harvesting activities. (Milledge et al. 2007: 198).

Given the influence of informal institutions and networks, reformers should consider using these to improve forest governance and accountability. An example of this that was observed during field work is the network of informal connections between DFOs and the FBD which can facilitate communication between reform-minded individuals where they exist. Similarly, the informal influence exerted by powerful individuals, which is destructive when it promotes impunity, can be put to constructive use. Positive examples of this are the recent appointment of a new FBD Director who is close to the President, and the presence of DEDs devoted to tackling forestry issues.

Further, public displays of commitment to anti-illegal logging efforts, such as personal visits by the President to the MNRT, are not wholly insincere or ineffective. They add force to the already growing public disapproval of and debate about illegal logging. Combined with measures such as the change of key personnel within the FBD (to reposition champions for reform), this can strengthen internal accountability (Milledge et al 2007: 194). Reactive measures and insincere pronouncements can therefore help to build a regulatory framework (such as PFM), and can also strengthen discourse that delegitimises illegal logging and increase public awareness.



### 3.3 Accountability in the forest sector

Fragmented forest governance and informal rules and relations weaken existing accountability mechanisms. The actors responsible for oversight and accountability in the logging supply chain in Tanzania include elected and non-elected officials (particularly civil servants such as the Presidentially-appointed DED, the FBD Director, and local authority civil servants such as the DFOs), and law-enforcement agents. The logic of accountability they work with depends on where these actors are located in the formal and informal accountability system, and on the perceived costs and benefits of supporting or working against accountability mechanisms.

In practice, despite the relevance of forest sector activities in Tanzania, citizens are not much inclined to hold government accountable for forest sector governance due to a lack of awareness of the potential costs and benefits of reform, and ignorance about the true potential value of forest produce (Milledge et al 2007).

## 4 The Mama Mitsu Campaign

As far as the MCC is concerned, three issues are relevant: first, the campaign must address the multiple overlapping local, national and international institutions and interests that shape the incentives of different stakeholders; second, incentives, interests and power dynamics may change with the cumulative effect of reforms and generate new opportunities for reformers, whatever the initial motivations or sincerity of measures; and third, the MCC operates in a dynamic institutional and political context, as interest structures are susceptible to change. As the TRAFFIC report demonstrates, key events can generate unexpected openings for reform by tipping the balance of power structures, and altering the costs and benefits of accountability strategies. The MMC can take advantage of this to develop strategies for change.

### 4.1 Key features of MMC

What are the innovative approaches to social accountability promoted by the MMC given Tanzania's particular political economy constraints?

#### *Working collaboratively*

One way to overcome entrenched private and public collusive networks is to develop pro-reform "countervailing networks" (Golomba-Mutebi 2009: 21) which are also informal.

The MMC works collaboratively through the TWFG member network (an internal network) and also with various national, district and village actors (an external network). The internal network helps to protect individual partners in politically difficult terrain and appears to strengthen the campaign by providing access to a range of areas of expertise (Box 9 and

#### **Box 9: Box 9: Internal campaign partnerships leveraging different skills at different levels**

Partnerships with JET (and environmental media CSO) and Femina (which targets youths and rural populations in radio and television broadcasts on a broad range of issues) ensure media coverage of the MMC and outreach to different audiences. The Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT), a legal aid CSO that engages in environmental public interest litigation, provides legal knowledge. Although currently focused on environmental litigation, this partnership could also be used to develop grass roots legal mobilisation strategies to raise awareness of enforcement and legal entitlements.

A key local level partnership in the Kilwa district with Mpingo (Kilwa district) promotes PFM and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification programme. The advantage of the FCS is that it gets communities premium prices for timber products. Mpingo helps with harvesting technology, biodiversity conservation, and provides monitoring and evaluation skills.

Box 10). But interviews show that there are communication gaps between partners, and the MMC must make better use of partner capabilities and areas of expertise to ensure member partners do not disengage from the campaign over time.

To make networks succeed, the campaign must establish a coalition for reform that extends beyond like-minded individuals already working together in CSOs. The MMC's attempts to develop an external network by collaborating on information flows, illustrate how CSOs can link supply-side and demand-side actors. Many reports of illegal activity were communicated by telephone (calls or SMS from mobile phones, usually) to local implementing partners and national campaign staff. Figure 4 and Figure 5 below (see annex) show the linkages in cases of suspected illegal activity, with the red lines indicating information flows that have been created or strengthened by the MMC. Because these information flow methods rely on informal mechanisms and might not survive the campaign, their sustainability is unclear. However, such methods work precisely because they are informal, allowing them to bypass potential bottlenecks in lines of reporting to high level FBD reform champions.

**Box 10: The Kikole community in the Kilwa district: The combined effects of international institutions (FSC), local institutions (PFM), and CSO activism (Mpingo, and the TNRF, including through MMC)**

The Kikole community, located in the Kilwa District in south-eastern Tanzania has taken advantage of PFM to establish ownership and control of local forests, with the goal of retaining a greater proportion of royalties from timber sales if forests are managed sustainably. The Kikole village has gained FSC certification, as part of an FSC Group certificate managed by the Mpingo Conservation Project (MCP). The new FSC Certificate enables communities to differentiate legal from illegal logging products and to receive a fair price.

***Communications strategy and use of knowledge***

PFM can make a difference on the ground, but this depends also on increased awareness of the potential benefits among different stakeholders. The deployment of knowledge to specific target audiences is therefore critical (Box 11).

The timing of the campaign was important, as the MCC was able to take strategic advantage of the TRAFFIC report findings to ensure maximum political visibility, forcing the government to respond and opening a window of opportunity for action.

The MMC has a national and local (district and village level) communications strategy, based on the conviction that different audiences must be reached and engaged through the deployment of evidence-based knowledge, through varied media including the radio, TV and print media and interactive methods.

The MMC has used evidence-based knowledge (the TRAFFIC Report findings) to raise awareness about the scale of the illegal timber trade in Tanzania and revenue losses incurred among international development partners, the

**Box 11: Knowledge as a driver of change**

Confiscated timber and round logs from the Nyamwage village forest reserves were sold using village by-laws, and the funds were deposited into the village account. Interviewees remarked that the MMC had broadened the community's understanding of PFM and JFM, allowing the village to develop a management plan in line with the District harvesting plan, including the demarcation of 10% of the forest as a fully protected area. Thus, village authorities have a mandate to control the harvest and protect their forest and its produce. The village forest management plan has been used to raise funds for an office building. As one leader noted, this has encouraged the participation of the patrol team in management activities, as they see concrete rewards (the revenue collected by the village). Stronger engagement with the Policy Forum, another MCC partner, will improve the capacity of the campaign to monitor improvements in, and accordingly adjust, social accountability efforts.

government, and the Tanzanian population. This can contribute to shifting incentive structures among different stakeholders to support improved forest governance. Well-targeted communications strategies can increase awareness of forest management policy, notably of PFM at the village and district levels, which is making a difference on the ground. But PFM benefits are not uniform (Ernst and Young 2010), so we are referring to their *potential* benefits, and to how knowledge can contribute to changing perceptions.

### ***Working politically: addressing the balance of power***

The key challenge for social accountability efforts of course lies in whether existing balance of power dynamics can be reshaped. Here a measure of realism is crucial, not least given the weight of entrenched vested interests and incentives that resist change of what can be achieved by demand side efforts. In any event it will require engaging in the difficult politics of addressing interest structures, in this case along the governance and timber production chain.

From the outset, a key feature of the MMC's promotion of PFM has been to move beyond a technical approach and to engage with issues of power, deliberately informing stakeholders along the governance chain about the concrete benefits of a change of conduct. This has involved a sustained effort to engage directly and in a differentiated manner with actors at the national, district and village levels of government, as well as with the international community.

It was decided that a confrontational advocacy approach regarding the findings of the report would limit the impact of the campaign, in part due to the presence and likely resistance of entrenched interests. But while raising community awareness addresses some aspects of the demand-side of accountability relationships, it is insufficient to promote change at other government levels. This requires *constructive engagement* with government and public officials within FBD structures, and with district and village level authorities. The MMC has aimed to combine this sort of multi-level engagement with public information and media campaigns focusing mainly on the revenue benefits for government of improved forest governance and curbs on illegal trading, as well as direct engagement with some of the government authorities.

During the pilot phase of the MMC, campaigners lobbied the authorities to commit to the TRAFFIC Report recommendations in a sustained manner, particularly with the FBD, which has been most consistently receptive to and supportive of the MMC. However, work with other MNRT members and MPs has also been important. Engagement with the legislature, for instance, led to an MP visit to China to investigate the scale of illegal timber exports. They were able to confirm the TRAFFIC Report's contention that ten times more timber was registered at Chinese ports of entry than was registered in Tanzanian export records. Although this information was not new, the fact that MPs took responsibility for confirming it shows how this kind of action can contribute to changing public discourse and citizen awareness of illegal logging.

Of course, such actions could serve to convey the appearance of action rather than to challenge the status quo, and the absence of punitive action may increase citizens' disillusionment with government, leading either to apathy or increased demand for change. Some interviewees also noted that some potential stakeholder allies for reform have perhaps not become as involved as might be hoped. Sustained work with MPs as regards the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) would have been useful given interest in the state revenue potential of improved forest governance. Moreover, the MMC has yet to engage with law enforcement actors.

Political work can promote the development of strategic alliances within key institutions such as the FBD, to change cost-benefit incentive structures for government institutions as regards illegal logging. But research on stakeholders' perceptions of the merits of PFM is still incipient, so we must be cautious about findings at this stage (see also Ernst and Young 2010).

### ***Informal networks***

Informal networks emerge from interpersonal relations that are developed over time. Their effectiveness depends on the cultivation of inter-personal and a sense of common purpose among stakeholders. On its own, cultivating informal networks is insufficient to shift incentives, but perceptions and interests can change over time through ongoing dialogue.

The MMC has succeeded in developing informal networks of contacts and relationships among diverse stakeholder networks, to identify strategic alliances and potential champions for reform. The relationship between the MMC partners, most notably between TNRF and the Director of the FBD, has been strategic. It has sometimes linked informal reporting on illegal actions with follow-up by senior FBD officials (TNRF 2010). Similarly, relationships forged with key DP individuals, with a role in funding MMC efforts, should not be underestimated. Overall, however, the pilot phase has focused on reaffirming relations within the FBD, and with district and village officials.

Fieldwork showed that more work needs to be done for the MMC to establish new informal networks with legal timber traders, and with law-enforcement and legal actors in the accountability chain.

The key point is that engaging with formal institutions is not enough. Working with the complex world of personal contacts can facilitate processes of change, permitting the identification potential strategic alliances with individual champions for reform.

## **4.2 The enabling environment**

What are the main enabling and disabling factors that shape the work of the MMC?

### ***Enabling factors***

#### *International factors*

- Alignment with international forest governance norms promotes narratives of forest governance that enhance accountability, and transnational civil society has a key role to play in this regard (Keck & Sikkink 1998). The MMC has taken advantage of relationships with key DPs (particularly the Norwegian and Finnish governments) to work on environmental issues (Box 12). Attracting donor support has been an important part of campaign since its inception. Key individuals have also facilitated the relationship with DPs. Tom Blomley, DANIDA advisor to the FBD, for example, played a central role in the initial collaboration and providing information and advice, as did Andreas Boehinger at GTZ.

#### **Box 12: Relevant international initiatives**

International influence on forest governance issues reflects the DP commitment to improved governance, and is also the result of a broader convergence with international conservation discourse. Additional donor funding is being made available for REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) projects in an attempt to promote forest conservation. The funding for pilot programmes is unlikely to shift incentives in the short term, but it has the potential to appeal to the patriarchal 'provider' accountability logic (much like the PFM), and should be explored in the second phase of the MMC. The MMC implementing partner in the Kilwa district is also engaging with local communities to promote their participation in international forest product certification schemes. To date, the total areas covered by this initiative in Tanzania and Africa in general remain small (FAO, 2009), but if the barriers to certification can be overcome, the premiums offered by certification may help to shift incentives in favour of sustainable production.

### *National factors*

- The developmental impact of decentralisation in Tanzania is mixed. Despite local implementation difficulties, decentralization has enabled MMC work with PFM. There was a consensus among interviewees that PFM is the formal institutional framework with the greatest potential to allow village communities to enjoy the benefits of owning and sustainably managing village adjacent forest resources. PFM is also seen by villagers as increasing their right to protect village land that is under threat from 'land-grabbing.'
- The MMC has taken advantage of the opportunities presented by the new prominence of public discourse on curbing illegal logging, and of political decisions such as the appointment of a champion for reform to the Directorship of the FBD. Likewise, the attempt to engage the support of potentially sympathetic MPs has been important.
- The MMC can take advantage of the TRAFFIC Report findings on national revenues resulting from improved forest governance to establish a strategic alliance with the Tanzania Revenue Authority, a powerful political ally that can potentially encourage executive support to curb illegal logging.
- Fieldwork confirms that private sector stakeholders in the legal timber trade believe they will gain from improved forest governance, accountability and law enforcement, and as such they are potentially crucial allies for the MMC. The transaction costs of impunity are high, as the payment of bribes to obtain harvesting, transport and export licenses acts as a double tax which is exorbitant for smaller businesses. Medium sized businesses and consortia of smaller enterprises are increasingly motivated to support measures that will enhance transparency, law enforcement and answerability.

### *District factors*

- The appointment of key reformers within districts can enhance PFM performance, and boost the impact of the MMC. Fieldwork shows that the arrival of a historically supportive DED in Kilwa improved the potential of PFM. But awareness that forest products can be a source of local government revenue can become a driver of change. Interviews suggest that the development of the TFF may promote this perception, as some district officials worry that PFM will diminish district revenue.

### *Village factors*

- In theory, PFM benefits should be greatest for village. Fieldwork confirmed the view (Blomley & Iddi 2009; Forrester 2008; TNRF 2010) that the MMC seems to be more effective where PFM is successfully underway, as it shows communities what the concrete benefits are and promotes an incentive structure that *helps to overcome limits on anti-logging collective action*.

### **Disabling Factors**

Many factors constrain the scope for CSO action. The operational constraints on the MMC pilot project have been documented (TNRF 2010), so we focus on those resulting from the political economy of the forestry sector.

### *International constraints*

- International economic power structures constitute formidable incentives for the illegal timber trade. First, there is competition with Mozambique and other neighbouring states. Second, the sources of (increasing) demand for forest products, including China, present new and powerful incentives for collusion between and the corruption of officials and traders. There is no sign that this will change in the near future, so other methods to shift incentives are needed.

### *National constraints*

- Various factors limit change at the national level, some of which the MMC can do nothing to change. The extent of territory that must be covered to establish effective oversight and law enforcement is an issue. The MJUMITA representative covering the Lindi, Mtwara, Ruvuma and Coast regions lamented he lacked the resources to monitor his entire jurisdiction. Human geography is also important. As the case of Rufiji shows, proximity to large urban centres substantially increases demand for illegal timber products which are harder to control (such as charcoal). The development of communications routes also increases such pressures: the opening of the Mkapa bridge has facilitated the transport of illegal products, and reduces costs for illegal logging interests (Milledge et al 2007; Blomley & Iddi 2009; interviews).
- The negative impact of dominant party rule and a strong presidential system, weak rule of law and poor horizontal accountability mechanisms, and the high profits obtained from illegal logging is formidable. A pervasive culture of impunity is a key barrier for reform, even if corruption scandals sometimes lead to judicial action. Collusive business-government official networks (not least in political party funding) stand in the way of change.
- Low levels of awareness of the market value of forest resources and of the legal framework of forest governance acutely limit action, nationally, at the district level and within villages.

### *District level constraints*

- Decentralisation has somewhat devolved elite capture to the local level and contributed to blurring lines of authority and reporting (see Section 3).
- Given capacity and resource shortfalls and persistent patterns of collusive conduct, lack of transparency, information and knowledge about forest governance law and enforcement remain pervasive.
- As fieldwork shows, power imbalances, the weight of illegal logging vested interests and collusive behaviour in villages and districts remain powerful, and potential reformers or whistle blowers are therefore ostracised or transferred elsewhere (Box 13).

#### **Box 13: Questionable links between business and district level officials**

In Muyuyu village, an active village executive officer was transferred to another village because they revealed business connections between traders and district officials.

In another village forest patrol officers caught individuals with illegal forest products and sent the case to district officials, but the culprits were not fined and there was no feedback to the patrol officers about the case. Such events are recurrent, reported in multiple interviews, and draw patrol officers into illicit activities.

- Power asymmetries led to the passive acceptance of illegal logging because of fears of intimidation and security threats. Fieldwork shows that community members in Somanga Simu fear that denouncing wrong-doing may lead to reprisals. Whistle-blowers are insufficiently protected, and confidentiality not assured.
- The presence of external actors further up the production chain represents an important obstacle to change. In Ikwiriri, in the Rufiji district, a WWF employee noted that illegal logging activities continue because district authorities have done nothing about a Chinese owned saw-mill which operates at night.

- Given weak rule of law and enforcement capacities, incentives for bribery are replicated along the timber trade chain and are especially problematic at checkpoints. It was remarked in a number of interviews that for the MMC to enhance its impact, it needs to engage more with the law-enforcement to maximise its impact.
- Under-resourcing of key structures that support formal institutions is problematic, particularly those charged with implementation and enforcement, such as DFOs.

#### *Village level constraints*

- Power asymmetries are reproduced at the village level, interfering with the work of the partnership.
- Interviewees noted that the absence of livelihood alternatives is a major barrier for change. Where PFM is underdeveloped or resisted at the district level, MMC incentive-shifting measures are unlikely to work, since the benefits of reform are not evident.
- Collusive business and village or district official networks also constrain reform.

#### **Box 14: Gaming the system**

Muyuyu villagers can take dead logs from the Ngumbuluni village forest with village environmental committee permits, but DC authorities issued permits to enable timber dealers to trade in dead logs from the villages (including Muyuyu). The research team was informed that, in some cases, dealers were not collecting dead timber but cutting down fresh trees and waiting until they looked like dead wood to collect them.

### **4.3 Recommendations for future phases of the Campaign**

When assessing the work of the MMC, we must take into account existing enabling and constraining factors. The campaign's strategy of engaging in a politically informed way across multiple levels and with multiple actors is innovative. But it must move beyond its focus on the harvesting stage of the timber value chain. Informal engagement with other levels of the governance structure that are relevant for other stages in the timber value chain – for instance, with the current FBD director – is a feature of the campaign, but is often carried out in an ad hoc fashion.

The MMC and related partnership activities should:

- Work further to address bottlenecks to existing accountability arrangements. This includes providing support for local law enforcement mechanisms, for PFM linkages with districts, and increasing receptiveness among key allies to demand-side activities (the FBD directorate, reformist DED as in Kilwa, and committed village authorities, as in Nyamwage). The MMC should also capitalise on REDD and the emerging framework of TFS and TFF, which may help to shifting incentive structures on revenue at the village and national levels.
- Expand the use of interactive communications that permit feedback and two-way communication, both horizontal (at each level) and vertical (between the local and national levels, for instance). This will make the MMC more responsive to emerging events and the concomitantly shifting needs of its partners and target groups.
- Continue to nurture and promote work with and through partners.

## 5 Conclusions

The MMC exemplifies an innovative approach to social accountability, grounded in a politically informed engagement with different levels of governance and stakeholders. While this should not be seen as blueprint approach for all CSO action, we can draw some general conclusions from this experience about how CSOs can effectively contribute to change.

- **Acting politically:** The MMC was able to leverage the findings of the TRAFFIC Report on the value of forest resources by acting politically. It appeals to alternative understandings of accountability based on material outcomes. Over time, increased revenues from improved forest management and curbing illegal logging may encourage a shift towards process-based accountability. In the short run, however, the value of outcome-based accountability should not be underestimated.
- **Strategic timing:** The MCC was able to use the TRAFFIC report findings on the magnitude of the problem caused by illegal timber trading, strategically timing its work to take advantage of media attention to forge (and force) strategic alliances among different stakeholders.
- **Cultivating personal relationships:** Working through informal and personal networks is important to identify champions of change. The MMC has worked effectively through local partnerships to ground the campaign in local processes of change, including those driven by PFM. It has also developed alliances and relationships at different levels of the governance chain
- **Alignment with international forest governance norms:** MMC goals support emerging narratives that enhance accountability in the use of forest resources. Establishing alliances with transnational civil society, ongoing engagement with DPs, and using emerging rules, institutions and national commitments to international agreements on forest governance have been crucial in this regard.
- **Linking local to other levels of governance:** MMC takes campaign strategies beyond the demand side approach to connect with supply side reform processes. It means working closely with local needs, capacities and incentives. The MMC has used local-level partnerships to ground the campaign in local processes of change, including those driven by the implementation of PFM. Crucially, however, linking local and the national and district levels of governance is what takes the strategy beyond the demand side approach to connect with supply side reform processes.
- **Using knowledge strategically:** The MMC has disseminated knowledge about the material value and empowering potential of good forest resources governance for communities, government and other stakeholders, most notably through PFM. Awareness of the potential benefits of ongoing PFM activities may induce key stakeholders to buy-in to reformed forest governance.

These elements of CSO action can have a positive impact on accountability by working with locally grounded understandings of accountability, and by informing (and empowering) communities on how to engage more effectively with legal accountability processes. Neo-patrimonial structures through the logic of political accountability may undermine legal accountability, but change involves identifying and working through these tensions. For this it is necessary to understand the interests and incentives that shape conduct, and identify the space for change. Over time, piece-meal and multi-layered strategies of vertical and societal accountability can contribute to transforming power relations.



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## Appendices:

### 1. Additional Figures

Figure 4: Information flows in cases of suspected illegal activity - non-MMC





Figure 5: Information flows in cases of suspected illegal activity - MMC impact



## 2. List of people consulted

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4. Joseph Kigula, Forestry and Bee-keeping Division, Assistant to the Director
5. Ben Selous, SHIVIMITA – Private sector association, Federation President
6. Dr. George Jambia, University of Dar Es Salaam
7. Emmanuel Massawe, Lawyers Environmental Action Team, Executive Director
8. Dr. Minou Fuglesang, Femina HIP, Executive Director
9. Sofie Gullberg, Femina HIP, (Program Officer)
10. Yassin Mkwizu, NORAD, Programmes Officer
11. Deodatus Mfugale, JET, Chairman
12. John Chikomo, JET, Executive director
13. John Filemon Gwao, Kibiti Checkpoint officer
14. Sebastian Raphael, Kibiti checkpoint officer
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16. Simon Mosha, Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG), Coastal Forests Project Officer.
17. Kassim Chilumba, Nyamwage Village, Village Executive Officer
18. Mohamedi Kileka, , Nyamwage Village, Commander of VNRC and Patrolman
19. Aisha Kimwaki, Nyamwage Village, Secretary of VNRC and Patrolwoman
20. Haji Mtoteke, Muyuyu Village, Ex-Village Executive Officer
21. Lucas Malugu, WWF, Project Executant Officer
22. Athumani Mtimbwa, MJUMITA network (Somanga village, Network coordinator)
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24. Aziza Salehe, Somanga Village, Secretary of the Village Natural Resource Committee
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26. Mustapha Mfangavo, Kilwa District, District Forest Officer
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